Ali Duran Topuz
The violent construction of a new state
The slogan of the "main opposition," which is now at odds with each other, has found its place: The coming one is coming. It is coming, so to speak; it is already here and passing. It is passing over us, through us.
The statute of limitations verdict in Madimak, the Gezi verdict, the statute of limitations in the Musa Anter case, and the Vartinis verdict that will "expire" on October 3 are our new reality. The closure case against the HDP (People's Democratic Party), the Kobane case, the Merdan Yanardag case, etc., are within the same framework. One of the latest snapshots that complete the picture was the visit of the Chief Prosecutor of the Court of Cassation, who filed the closure case against HDP to Meral Aksener's party. Nobody has yet devised an alternative to weeping, crying, or praying that "It will pass (popstar Tarkan's song)" for all of this.
Does the weeping grow quite tiresome, even if it is justified? The opposition emphasizes that the government disobeys the law and the constitution. Unfairness, lawlessness, the end of the EU process, and a lack of investment are all present. But despite all odds, such a state is conceivable. Investment will thus come, is coming, and will come.
In actuality, the new state that is being created is characterized by this draconian lawlessness. The state is primarily a tool for committing acts of violence, and what is referred to as "law" is only a systematized framework. Law only takes place when the state's violence has won out. The state is born out of a series of violent deeds. Of course, we can discuss a law "against the state, limiting the state," but this can only be accomplished through various conflicts.
If the state's founding violence manifests during its formation, it also does so upon its dissolution or reestablishment. We observe that the new state, created by the AKP (Justice and Development Party) and its allies, is using the machinery of violence to enact the desired new law, and the court is working as an integral part of this machinery. One of the decisions prompted by the violence on the frontier of a new state is the verdict in the Gezi trial. The violence at the core of the state, which has no rules other than the bare desires of those in power, is at play, which is why it appears contrary to the norms, principles, and methods of reasoning that we know, recognize, and accept as "law" despite some objections. In other words, this is why it does not seem to be law as we know it and is ultimately "anti-law."
Weeping and crying are ineffective ways to deal with this kind of aggression. The violence that emerges from the foundation and collapse process, which acknowledges the naked, sovereign ruler's wishes as the only law, does not respect boundaries, principles, rules, norms, or morality except the opposing forces that can stop it. The phenomenon that goes along with this display of governmental power, which we might refer to as the "socialization of violence," or the growth of mafias and other organizations that engage in organized civilian violence, is a typical result of this corrupt, rule-free, normless, and immoral activity. Because the "extortion" process used to raise the money the new state needs for its operations needs this "gross lawlessness" to function. The capital known as investment will come because it results from such "extortion," so to speak. There is no lawlessness; instead, the usurpation regime's legislation is in force with the hope that, given enough time, it will be recognized as a regular law. It usurps identity and body, labor, surplus value, knowledge, and confidence.
Contrary to what is frequently asserted, capital does not seek "law" but rather "lawlessness" as security; otherwise, the capitalists of Turkey and the rest of the globe would not be cooperating in keeping such a blissful quiet about the flagrant illegality imposed on Osman Kavala. The founders of the emerging new state, who are part of a delegation that is fully aware of this, are making the following very explicit proposition to everyone: For instance, one of these deals was the Chief Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Appeals' visit to the IYI Party: You did what you had to do in the general elections; congratulations; now if you do what you will do in the local elections, we will recognize you as a good party that effectively takes advantage of the opportunities presented by the new state. This invitation, or "courtesy call" in its other incarnation, is unavoidably accompanied by a form of blackmail by the recent violence in power: Look, we are coming to you today as a courtesy tomorrow, but we can also come "legally." She will accept the chief prosecutor's cordial invitation because the IYI Party is not the HDP, and Aksener is not Selahattin Demirtas.
In short, what appears to be lawless, illegal, and immoral in everything happening is none other than the bare (unrestrained) violence committed in the service of the state, which is now undergoing a process of self-reconstitution. Instead of moaning, weeping, or complaining, we should work to build the oppositional force that will stop it in its tracks and discover methods to stand in solidarity with those doing so. Where the main targets and victims of this violence are, that is where you will find this path: the exploited worker, the oppressed peasant, the Kurd who wants to be wiped out, the Greek, Armenian, and Jew who rejoices at being wiped out, the Alevi who is not treated equally, the prisoners persecuted by the unlawful violence at work... The "rule of law" is not brought about by prayer; instead, if such a thing is possible, it is something whose lawlessness is eliminated and leveled by the battle of the forces against it.
Local elections are forthcoming, and all these choices, visits, statements, bans, and arrests send a message: Are you supporting the new/in-progress state in this election, or are you supporting the people the new state wants to squelch and crush?